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#### Executive war powers up under Obama

Conor Friedersdorf, “Obama Acts Like He Doesn't Know He's an Executive-Power Extremist,” The Atlantic, 9/12/2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/obama-acts-like-he-doesnt-know-hes-an-executive-power-extremist/279583/

What a fascinating paragraph! Even as Obama implies that he is a circumspect steward of constitutional democracy, he asserts that even absent "a direct or imminent threat," he has absolute power to wage war without congressional support, the Constitution and the opinions of the demos be damned. If the passage ended there it would be staggering in its internal tension. As Jack Goldsmith explained in detail, intervening in Syria without congressional sign-off would "push presidential war unilateralism beyond where it has gone before." Asserting that power without using it is still an extreme position to take. Obama goes a delusion farther. Ostensibly because he hasn't yet intervened, even though he repeatedly and needlessly asserts his right to do so unilaterally, he casts himself as moving away from unilateralism and toward consulting Congress. The benefits are "especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president," he notes, "while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force." The grammer is priceless. Who "put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president"? In Obama's telling, "a decade" put the executive power there. The absence of a human subject in the sentence isn't hard to figure out. For all President George W. Bush's faults, he sought and received majority support for the Patriot Act, the September 2001 AUMF, the War in Afghanistan, and the War in Iraq. Obama's expansion of the drone war and his illegal war-making in Libya didn't turn out as bad as Iraq, so it's hard to see him as a worse president, but Obama has done more than Bush to expand the war-making power of the White House. As for "sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force," it's Obama who went into Libya despite the fact that a House vote to approve U.S. involvement was brought to the floor and voted down. Yet Obama complains about these trends as if someone other than Obama is responsible for them, and as if he has been and remains powerless to do more to reverse them. When Obama asked Congress to vote in Syria, no one forced him to insist that he had the power to intervene militarily even if a legislative vote declared otherwise. No one forced him to defend the extreme position that the presidential war power is so sweeping that it includes waging wars of choice rejected by Congress that don't involve any direct or imminent threat to the United States. He went out of his way to defend that maximal precedent, even as gave us the impression that he was trying to rein in executive power that he claims to find regrettable and worrisome. It's all consistent with Obama's favorite rhetorical tactic: granting the validity of an objection in his rhetoric, then totally ignoring the objection in his actions. In so doing, he confuses public discourse and subverts debate. We know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions. He believes the president has the power to intervene militarily without Congress in places that do not threaten America; that he can order American citizens killed in secret without due process; that he can secretly collect data on the phone calls of all Americans; that he can invoke the state-secrets privilege to avoid adjudicating constitutional challenges to his policies on their merits; that he can indefinitely detain prisoners without evidence, charges or due process, that he can sit in judgment of anyone on earth, then send a drone anywhere to strike them.

#### Congressional interference signals a diluted American commitment to force – that emboldens enemies

Newton ’12 Michael A. Newton, professor at Vanderbilt Law, “Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2232354

The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that **our enemies now focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast capabilities**. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to “seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression.”62 President Clinton understood the importance of clear communication with the Congress and the American people in order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in Sudan, he argued that the “risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact.”63 In his letter to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” the president reported that the strikes “were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities” and “were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat.”64 The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the president explained his decision to take military action, stating, “Our goals were to disrupt bin Laden’s terrorist network and destroy elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network is associated, which was producing an ingredient essential for nerve gas.”65 Citing “compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was poised to strike at us again” and was seeking to acquire chemical weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes.66 Similarly, President Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to form during the long Bosnian civil war.67 Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.68 Seeking to bolster legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he explained that: It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an important weight in the scales. To remove the marines would put both the Government and what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our domestic controversy over the war powers has been so disturbing. **Uncertainty about the American commitment can** only weaken **our effectiveness. Doubts about** our staying power can only cause political **aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure.** An accommodation between the President and Congress to resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our staying power and strengthen our political hand.69 Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought.70 The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993.71 The White House released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the [Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”72 President Obama consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited, unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to strike back with conventional means), and likely to end expeditiously.73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the War Powers Resolution.74 The president’s reasoning rested on previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a fact- specific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of the planned military operations.”75 Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”76 The OLC engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995, explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of the operation.”77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the War Powers Resolution.78 The deadline passed with little fanfare. The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual aerial bombardments.”79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term, limited deployments, **the War Powers Resolution embeds an inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches.** **Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine political will in the US Congress and among the American people from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure that such debates over the national political will take center stage sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory erode our political will even before it solidifies.**

#### Exec flex key to prevent WMD use from rogue states and a litany of international terrorists

Royal ’11 JOHN PAUL ROYAL, “War Powers and the Age of Terrorism,” Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress The Fellows Review 2011, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Royal-\_Final\_Paper.pdf

The international system itself and national security challenges to the United States in particular, underwent rapid and significant change in the first decade of the twenty-first century. War can no longer be thought about strictly in the terms of the system and tradition created by the Treaty of Westphalia over three and a half centuries ago. Non-state actors now possess a level of destructiveness formerly enjoyed only by nation states. Global terrorism, coupled with the threat of weapons of mass destruction developed organically or obtained from rogue regimes, presents new challenges to U.S. national security and place innovative demands on the Constitution’s system of making war. In the past, as summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report, threats emerged due to hostile actions taken by enemy states and their ability to muster large enough forces to wage war: “Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred" (National Commission 2004, 362). This mindset assumed that peace was the default state for American national security. Today however, we know that threats can emerge quickly. Terrorist organizations half-way around the world are able to wield weapons of unparalleled destructive power. These attacks are more difficult to detect and deter due to their unconventional and asymmetrical nature. In light of these new asymmetric threats and the resultant changes to the international system, peace can no longer be considered the default state of American national security. Many have argued that the Constitution permits the president to use unilateral action only in response to an imminent direct attack on the United States. In the emerging security environment described above, pre-emptive action taken by the executive branch may be needed more often than when nation-states were the principal threat to American national interests. Here again, the 9/11 Commission Report is instructive as it considers the possibility of pre-emptive force utilized over large geographic areas due to the diffuse nature of terrorist networks: In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this sense, the American homeland is the planet (National Commission 2004, 362). Furthermore, the report explicitly describes the global nature of the threat and the global mission that must take place to address it. Its first strategic policy recommendation against terrorism states that the: U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power (National Commission 2004, 367). Thus, fighting continues against terrorists in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and beyond, as we approach the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, into the hands of these terrorists is the most dangerous threat to the United States. We know from the 9/11 Commission Report that Al Qaeda has attempted to make and obtain nuclear weapons for at least the past fifteen years. Al Qaeda considers the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a religious obligation while “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials” (National Commission 2004, 397). Considering these statements, rogue regimes that are openly hostile to the United States and have or seek to develop nuclear weapons capability such as North Korea and Iran, or extremely unstable nuclear countries such as Pakistan, pose a special threat to American national security interests. These nations were not necessarily a direct threat to the United States in the past. Now, however, due to proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, they can inflict damage at considerably higher levels and magnitudes than in the past. In addition, these regimes may pursue proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to other nations and to allied terrorist organizations. The United States must pursue condign punishment and appropriate, rapid action against hostile terrorist organizations, rogue nation states, and nuclear weapons proliferation threats in order to protect American interests both at home and abroad. Combating these threats are the “top national security priority for the United States…with the full support of Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people” (National Commission 2004, 361). Operations may take the form of pre-emptive and sustained action against those who have expressed hostility or declared war on the United States. Only the executive branch can effectively execute this mission, authorized by the 2001 AUMF. If the national consensus or the nature of the threat changes, Congress possesses the intrinsic power to rescind and limit these powers.

### PTX

#### Obama holding the line on debt ceiling – forces GOP infighting that guarantees victory

AP 9/27 “Obama's No-Negotiation Stance Setting New Tone” Associated Press, 9/27/2013, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=226711712

WASHINGTON (AP) — This time, President Barack Obama says, he's not budging. This is the confrontational Obama, the "Make my day" president, betting Republicans blink to avoid a government shutdown or a first-ever default of the nation's debts. It's a proposition not without risk and one with a history of last-minute accommodations on both sides. Brinkmanship between Obama and congressional Republicans has often stopped at the precipice's edge. In this round, however, the president and his aides maintain that when it comes to raising the government's borrowing authority and meeting its debt obligations, there's no bargaining. To conservatives wishing to undo the 3-year-old health care law in exchange for an increase in the nation's credit, Obama on Friday said bluntly: "That's not going to happen." "I don't know how I can be more clear about this: Nobody gets to threaten the full faith and credit of the United States just to extract political concessions," Obama said in a surprise appearance in the White House briefing room. Still, House Speaker John Boehner says a debt hike must be linked to budget cuts and other programmatic changes. "The president says, 'I'm not going to negotiate,'" Boehner said. "Well, I'm sorry, but it just doesn't work that way." Obama's stance is rooted in experience, politics and a desire to protect himself from similar demands in the remaining three years of his presidency. Obama advisers note that past negotiations have not yielded grand bargains and that the mere threat of default in 2011 rattled the economy, causing a downgrade in U.S. credit. Talks earlier this year to avoid automatic spending cuts known as sequestration also failed. Obama aides also note that Boehner himself eight months ago declared an end to negotiations with Obama, favoring the regular legislative process instead. That process has proved messy for the GOP, and senior White House aides insist that in a standoff, Republicans will be perceived as the unreasonable party. And the White House is convinced any concession would place the president in the position of having to bargain again and again when the next debt ceiling looms. "I'm not going to start setting a precedent, not just for me, but for future presidents, where one chamber in Congress can basically say each time there needs to be a vote to make sure Treasury pays its bills, we're not going to sign it unless our particular hobby horse gets advanced," Obama said Friday. His advisers only see a downside if Obama doesn't stand his ground. "Every poll I've seen suggests that while no one escapes cleanly from a shutdown, the GOP would bear the brunt," former senior White House counselor and Obama adviser David Axelrod said. "The bigger danger for the president is to put himself in a position to be constantly held hostage. First they want an arm. Then they want a leg. It's unsustainable." House Republican leaders, meanwhile, want to attach other provisions to the debt ceiling, including approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and provisions blocking pollution regulations. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., on Thursday demanded the GOP-controlled House simply send the Senate unencumbered spending and debt ceiling bills. "There's no need for conversations," Reid said. "We've spoken loudly and clearly, and we have the support of the president of the United States. And that's pretty good." The Pew Research Center, however, found nearly 6 out of 10 Americans want politicians they side with to be more willing to engage in talks. And the public split about evenly in the Pew poll on who would be responsible if the government shut down, with 39 percent blaming Republicans and 36 percent Obama and much of the rest blaming both. "The president may not be playing this just for this set and this match," said Patrick Griffin, the White House legislative director under President Bill Clinton. "As his tenure goes on and his legacy looms larger, he might not be as poll sensitive as he might be otherwise." White House aides say Obama is still willing to negotiate over a long-term spending deal, just not as part of raising the debt ceiling. But the opportunity for that could be short-lived, too. The Senate version of the short-term spending bill would set up another possible government shutdown as soon as Nov. 16. What's more, lines in the sand have blurred before. Obama ran for re-election vowing to increase taxes on individuals making more than $200,000. Republicans insisted they would not raise taxes at all. In the end, both settled on a hike on incomes above $400,000. Most recently, Obama altered course on Syria, at first determined to launch missile strikes against its regime, then seeking congressional support before taking a diplomatic path aimed at destroying Syria's chemical stockpile. The White House also sees the current showdown as an opportunity to cast the Republican Party in the image of Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, a leader in the effort to kill Obama's health care law. "They have allowed Ted Cruz to be their face, write their charter and steer their ship," said senior White House adviser Dan Pfeiffer. "That is a decision that has real consequences for how the American people view the Republican Party as we head into this debate." Still, if the White House is eager to stitch Cruz' name to the Republican Party banner, many Senate Republicans were doing their best to distance themselves from the Texan and his aggressive tactics. Indeed, as much as Republicans dislike the health care law, many Republicans argue that seeking to kill it is fruitless as long as Obama is president and Democrats control the Senate.

#### Congressional support for drone oversight kills political capital, requires lots of deal making

Mazzetti and Landler 8/2 MARK MAZZETTI and MARK LANDLER, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change in Drone Wars,” New York Times, 8/2/2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

Congressional pressure for a public accounting of the drone wars has largely receded, another factor allowing the Obama administration to carry out operations from behind a veil of secrecy. This year, several senators held up the nomination of John O. Brennan as C.I.A. director to get access to Justice Department legal opinions justifying drone operations. During that session, Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, delivered a nearly 13-hour filibuster, railing against the Obama administration for killing American citizens overseas without trial. For all that, though, the White House was able to get Mr. Brennan confirmed by the Senate without having to give lawmakers all the legal memos. And, in the months since, there has been little public debate on Capitol Hill about drones, targeted killing and the new American way of war.

#### Political capital is key and failure to pass collapses the economy

Moore 9/10 Heidi Moore, “Syria: the great distraction,’ The Guardian (UK) 9/10/2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester/print> jss

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

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#### The President of the United States should end targeted killings.

#### Executive action solves

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf)

The president of the United States should limit targeted killings to individuals who U.S. officials claim are being targeted—the leadership of al-Qaeda and affiliated forces or individuals with a direct operational role in past or ongoing terrorist plots against the United States and its allies—and bring drone strike practices in line with stated policies; ■■ either end the practice of signature strikes or provide a public accounting of how it meets the principles of distinction and proportionality that the Obama administration claims; ■■ review its current policy whereby the executive authority for drone strikes is split between the CIA and JSOC, as each has vastly different legal authorities, degrees of permissible transparency, and oversight; ■■ provide information to the public, Congress, and UN special rapporteurs— without disclosing classified information—on what procedures exist to prevent harm to civilians, including collateral damage mitigation, investigations into collateral damage, corrective actions based on those investigations, and amends for civilian losses; and never conduct nonbattlefield targeted killings without an accountable human being authorizing the strike (while retaining the potential necessity of autonomous decisions to use lethal force in warfare in response to ground-based antiaircraft fire or aerial combat).

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#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a Targeted Killing Court with jurisdiction to apply a strict scrutiny standard to executive targeted killing orders.

#### Solves credibility advantage – credible legal norms are non-existent – US action to enhance transparency and predictability is key to influencing global actors

Byman ’13 Daniel L. Byman, Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ Brookings, former Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman

The fact remains that by using drones so much, Washington risks setting a troublesome precedent with regard to extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings. Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International contends that “when the U.S. government violates international law, that sets a precedent and provides an excuse for the rest of the world to do the same.” And it is alarming to think what leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has used deadly force against peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators he has deemed terrorists, would do with drones of their own. Similarly, Iran could mockingly cite the U.S. precedent to justify sending drones after rebels in Syria. Even Brennan has conceded that the administration is “establishing precedents that other nations may follow.” Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible; that horse left the barn years ago. Drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce, and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring and using them. Nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals, and China is producing several inexpensive models for export. Armed drones are more difficult to produce and deploy, but they, too, will likely spread rapidly. Beijing even recently announced (although later denied) that it had considered sending a drone to Myanmar (also called Burma) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there. The spread of drones cannot be stopped, but the United States can still influence how they are used. The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists—and stick to it. Fortunately, Obama has begun to discuss what constitutes a legitimate drone strike. But the definition remains murky, and this murkiness will undermine the president’s ability to denounce other countries’ behavior should they start using drones or other means to hunt down enemies. By keeping its policy secret, Washington also makes it easier for critics to claim that the United States is wantonly slaughtering innocents. More transparency would make it harder for countries such as Pakistan to make outlandish claims about what the United States is doing. Drones actually protect many Pakistanis, and Washington should emphasize this fact. By being more open, the administration could also show that it carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike.

#### Solves terrorism advantage – consistent process key to diminish civilian casualties – status quo approach guarantees excessive, misguided, and insufficiently planned strikes

Guiora and Blank 12 (Amos and Laurie, prof of law at the SJ Quinney College of Law university of Utah, director of Emory Law's International Humanitarian Law Clinic, dw: 8-10-2012, da: 9-11-2013, lido)

Ultimately, the lawfulness of targeted killing depends, in large part, on the efficacy of the internal administrative measures adopted to identify targets and minimize civilian casualties. Only when those procedures are effective and discriminating will targeted killing be both legal and moral. Why? Because targeted killing is not about encountering a division of the enemy's forces on the battlefield and stopping it from advancing across the front towards your borders or essential infrastructure. That is the stuff of traditional conflict, of trench warfare and tank warfare and state versus state conflict. Instead, targeted killing rests on the specific identification of individuals who pose an imminent threat to the state's national security and are therefore legitimate targets within the framework of lawful self-defense. The state thus needs a method and a process for figuring out who poses a threat, why they pose a threat, and how that threat can be deterred or eliminated. The current US approach, however, is far too suggestive of "guilt by association" – targeting individuals whose involvement in terrorism is broadly defined, potentially without reliance on criteria, standards and limits. In a recent speech, President Obama's counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, stated: "We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of "imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts." [Our italics.] Brennan's words – whoever his audience and whatever the purpose – drastically undermine American morality and commitment to the rule of law. A "flexible understanding of imminence" ultimately produces an approach that can only be defined as "kill all the bad guys". If everyone who constitutes "a bad guy" is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability and other factors simply goes out the window. Expansiveness and flexibility eliminate any sense of what is proportional, in the broadest sense of the term. If all threats are always imminent, then all responses are always proportionate. Self-defense becomes a mantra that justifies all action, regardless of method or procedure. Flexibility regarding imminence and threat-perception means that the identification of legitimate targets – the true essence of moral operational counterterrorism – becomes looser and less precise. In turn, expanded notions of legitimate target and the right of self-defense introduce greater flexibility with regard to collateral damage – both in terms of who constitutes collateral damage and how much collateral damage is justified in the course of targeting a particular threat. The result: flexibility plus the absence of criteria, process and procedure means that the notion of proportionality that should guide decision-making and operations ends up entirely out of proportion. In the high-stakes world of operational counterterrorism, there is no room for imprecision and casual definitions. The risks, to innocent civilians on both sides and to our fundamental values, are just too high.

#### Net benefit is executive flex DA and the case turns and the politics DA

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#### Can’t solve soft power—massive budget cuts and lack of organization make single issues minute—their solvency takes decades

Nye ’11 Joseph Nye, invented ‘soft power’ and also Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, “The War on Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 4/12/2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the\_war\_on\_soft\_power?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama and Congress struggled until the 11th hour to agree on budget cuts that would avert a government shutdown. The United States' budget deficit is a serious problem, and there have been serious proposals to deal with it, such as those by the bipartisan Bowles-Simpson Commission. But last week's efforts were not a serious solution. They were focused solely on the 12 percent of the budget that is non-military discretionary expenditure, rather than the big-ticket items of entitlements, military expenditure, and tax changes that increase revenue. Yet while last week's cuts failed to do much about the deficit, they could do serious damage to U.S. foreign policy. On Tuesday, the axe fell: The State Department and foreign operations budget was slashed by $8.5 billion -- a pittance when compared to military spending, but one that could put a serious dent in the United States' ability to positively influence events abroad. The sad irony is that the Obama administration had been moving things in the right direction. When Hillary Clinton became secretary of state, she spoke of the importance of a "smart power" strategy, combining the United States' hard and soft-power resources. Her Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and her efforts (along with USAID chief Rajiv Shah) to revamp the United States' aid bureaucracy and budget were important steps in that direction. Now, in the name of an illusory contribution to deficit reduction (when you're talking about deficits in the trillions, $38 billion in savings is a drop in the bucket), those efforts have been set back. Polls consistently show a popular misconception that aid is a significant part of the U.S. federal budget, when in fact it amounts to less than 1 percent. Thus, congressional cuts to aid in the name of deficit reduction are an easy vote, but a cheap shot. In 2007, Richard Armitage and I co-chaired a bipartisan Smart Power Commission of members of Congress, former ambassadors, retired military officers, and heads of non-profit organizations at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. We concluded that America's image and influence had declined in recent years and that the United States had to move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope. The Smart Power Commission was not alone in this conclusion. Even when he was in the George W. Bush administration, Defense Secretary Robert Gates called on Congress to commit more money and effort to soft-power tools including diplomacy, economic assistance, and communications because the military alone cannot defend America's interests around the world. He pointed out that military spending then totaled nearly half a trillion dollars annually, compared with a State Department budget of just $36 billion. In his words, "I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power." He acknowledged that for the secretary of defense to plead for more resources for the State Department was as odd as a man biting a dog, but these are not normal times. Since then, the ratio of the budgets has become even more unbalanced. This is not to belittle the Pentagon, where I once served as an assistant secretary. Military force is obviously a source of hard power, but the same resource can sometimes contribute to soft-power behavior. A well-run military can be a source of prestige, and military-to-military cooperation and training programs, for example, can establish transnational networks that enhance a country's soft power. The U.S. military's impressive performance in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the South Asian earthquake in 2005 helped restore the attractiveness of the United States; the military's role in the aftermath of the recent Japanese earthquake and tsunami is having a similar effect. Of course, misusing military resources can also undercut soft power. The Soviet Union had a great deal of soft power in the years after World War II, but destroyed it by using hard power against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Brutality and indifference to just-war principles of discrimination and proportionality can also eviscerate legitimacy. Whatever admiration the crisp efficiency of the Iraq invasion inspired in the eyes of some foreigners, it was undercut by the subsequent inefficiency of the occupation and the scenes of mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Smart power is the ability to combine the hard power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction into a successful strategy. U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power in recent years because it is the most direct and visible source of American strength. The Pentagon is the best-trained and best-resourced arm of the U.S. government, but there are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own. Democracy, human rights, and civil society are not best promoted with the barrel of a gun. It is true that the U.S. military has an impressive operational capacity, but the practice of turning to the Pentagon because it can get things done leads to the image of an over-militarized foreign policy. Moreover, it can create a destructive cycle, as the capacity of civilian agencies and tools gets hollowed out to feed the military budget. Today, the United States spends about 500 times more on its military than it does on broadcasting and exchanges combined. Congress cuts shortwave broadcasts to save the equivalent of one hour of the defense budget. Is that smart? It sounds like common sense, but smart power is not so easy to carry out in practice. Diplomacy and foreign assistance are often underfunded and neglected, in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating their short-term impact on critical challenges. The payoffs for exchange and assistance programs is often measured in decades, not weeks or months. American foreign-policy institutions and personnel, moreover, are fractured and compartmentalized, and there is not an adequate interagency process for developing and funding a smart-power strategy. Many official instruments of soft or attractive power -- public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts -- are scattered around the government, and there is no overarching strategy or budget that even tries to integrate them.

#### Alt causes – Doha, warming, Arab Spring, free trade, economy

Neu 13 (C. Richard, Senior Economist at RAND with PhD from Harvard. “U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch” The RAND Blog 2/9/2013 <http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html>) will

U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on contributions—political and financial—to major institutions and initiatives—International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world better.¶ But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer lead?

#### Prolif is the best internal link to conflict mitigation—rationality and risk transparency force states to practice care in interacting with enemies

Tepperman ‘9 Jonathan Tepperman, Newsweek International’s Assistant Managing Editor and Deputy Director, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs Magazine, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” Newsweek, 8/28/2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

#### Credibility of force is irrelevant because US capabilities are still overwhelming – other countries have to assume the worst even if we appear unwilling to use force

Chapman ’13 Steve Chapman, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, “War in Syria: The Endless Quest for Credibility,” Reason.com, 9/5/2013, http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/05/war-in-syria-the-endless-quest-for-credi

The United States boasts the most powerful military on Earth. We have 1.4 million active-duty personnel, thousands of tanks, ships and planes, and 5,000 nuclear warheads. We spend more on defense than the next 13 countries combined. Yet we are told we have to bomb Syria to preserve our credibility in world affairs. Really? You'd think it would be every other country that would need to confirm its seriousness. Since 1991, notes University of Chicago security scholar John Mearsheimer, the U.S. has been at war in two out of every three years. If we haven't secured our reputation by now, it's hard to imagine we ever could. On the surface, American credibility resembles a mammoth fortress, impervious to anything an enemy could inflict. But to crusading internationalists, both liberal and conservative, it's a house of cards: The tiniest wrong move, and it collapses. In a sense, though, they're right. The U.S. government doesn't have to impress the rest of the world with its willingness to defend against actual attacks or direct threats. But it does have to continually persuade everyone that we will lavish blood and treasure for purposes that are irrelevant to our security. Syria illustrates the problem. Most governments don't fight unless they are attacked or have dreams of conquest and expansion. War is often expensive and debilitating even for the winners, and it's usually catastrophic for losers. Most leaders do their best to avoid it. So even though the Syrian government is a vicious, repressive dictatorship with a serious grudge against Israel, it has mostly steered clear of military conflict. Not since 1982 has it dared to challenge Israel on the battlefield. When Israeli warplanes vaporized a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007, Bashar al-Assad did nothing. The risks of responding were too dire. But the U.S. never faces such sobering considerations. We are more secure than any country in the history of the world. What almost all of our recent military interventions have in common is that they involved countries that had not attacked us: Libya, Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, Grenada and North Vietnam. With the notable exception of the Afghanistan invasion, we don't fight wars of necessity. We fight wars of choice. That's why we have such an insatiable hunger for credibility. In our case, it connotes an undisputed commitment to go into harm's way even when -- especially when -- we have no compelling need to do so. But it's a sale we can never quite close. Using force in Iraq or Libya provides no guarantee we'll do the same in Syria or Iran or Lower Slobbovia. Because we always have the option of staying out, there's no way to make everyone totally believe we'll jump into the next crisis. The parallel claim of Washington hawks is that we have to punish Assad for using nerve gas, because otherwise Iran will conclude it can acquire nuclear weapons. Again, our credibility is at stake. But how could the Tehran regime draw any certain conclusions based on what happens in Syria? Two American presidents let a troublesome Saddam Hussein stay in power, but a third one decided to take him out. George W. Bush tolerated Moammar Gadhafi, but Barack Obama didn't. Ronald Reagan let us be chased out of Lebanon, only to turn around and invade Grenada. If you've seen one U.S. intervention, you've seen one. What should be plain to Iran is that Washington sees nuclear proliferation as a unique threat to its security, which Syria's chemical weapons are not. Just because we might let Assad get away with gassing his people doesn't mean we will let Iran acquire weapons of mass destruction that would be used only against other countries. Heck, we not only let Saddam get away with using chemical weapons against Iran -- we took his side. Figuring out the U.S. government's future impulses is hard even for Americans. There's no real rhyme or reason. But because we're so powerful, other governments can ill afford to be wrong. What foreigners have to keep in the front of their minds is not our inclination to act but our capacity to act -- which remains unparalleled whatever we do in Syria. Credibility is overrated. Sure, it's possible for hostile governments to watch us squabble over Syria and conclude that they can safely do things we regard as dangerous. But there are graveyards full of people who made that bet.

### 2

#### Drone strikes best solve terror

Byman ’13 Daniel L. Byman, Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ Brookings, former Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman jss

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

#### Drones key to target militant groups while minimizing unnecessary casualties

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Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused. Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and **drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.**

#### Civilian casualties are exaggerated – drones are the most safe and precise form of warfare to decrease innocent death

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The truth is that all the public numbers are unreliable. Who constitutes a civilian is often unclear; when trying to kill the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, the United States also killed his doctor. The doctor was not targeting U.S. or allied forces, but he was aiding a known terrorist leader. In addition, most strikes are carried out in such remote locations that it is nearly impossible for independent sources to verify who was killed. In Pakistan, for example, the overwhelming majority of drone killings occur in tribal areas that lie outside the government’s control and are prohibitively dangerous for Westerners and independent local journalists to enter. Thus, although the New America Foundation has come under fire for relying heavily on unverifiable information provided by anonymous U.S. officials, reports from local Pakistani organizations, and the Western organizations that rely on them, are no better: their numbers are frequently doctored by the Pakistani government or by militant groups. After a strike in Pakistan, militants often cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves. The U.S. media often then draw on such faulty reporting to give the illusion of having used multiple sources. As a result, statistics on civilians killed by drones are often inflated. One of the few truly independent on-the-ground reporting efforts, conducted by the Associated Press last year, concluded that the strikes “are killing far fewer civilians than many in [Pakistan] are led to believe.” But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths—about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism—is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone’s real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone’s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force.

#### Recruitment is irrelevant to the effectiveness of the War on Terror – their evidence is biased and not reverse-causal

Morehouse ’11 Matthew A. Morehouse, MA candidate at U of Nebraska – Lincoln, “Hellfire and Grey Drones: An Empirical Examination of the Effectiveness of Targeted Killings,” May 2011, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=poliscitheses> john clare

A critical question one must ask in formulating a qualitative method for gauging the effectiveness of targeted killings is if terrorist recruitment should serve as a variable. Specifically, should the possibility of there being a positive (or negative, or inverse) relationship between targeted killings and terrorist recruitment levels be taken into account in a qualitative model? Whilst some may argue that this should be the case, this study takes the position that such a variable would be difficult to accurately account for in a qualitative (or, quantitative, for that matter) model. At issue is the ability for one to properly measure what the level/volume of terrorist recruitment would have been in the absence of targeted killings. One could not honestly argue that targeted killings cause an increase (or decrease) in terrorist recruitment levels unless one would know what would otherwise have occurred in terrorist recruitment. The construction of such a model would present great difficulties for a researcher. Firstly, it would be nigh impossible for one to obtain the actual data pertaining to recruitment numbers over time from a terrorist group. Secondly, if one were to hypothetically obtain accurate information on this topic, how would one be able to determine what was the cause of changes in recruitment levels over time? One could not simply assume that changes in recruitment levels were solely determined by changes in the number of targeted killings. Factors such as the territory controlled by coalition forces, the territory controlled by militants, the methods which the militants utilize for their recruitment drives, the economic situation in the states in which militant groups are operating, etcetera could all or in part each account for variations in terrorist recruitment numbers over time. One could not accurately measure the influence of targeted killings upon terrorist recruitment unless one knew exactly why recruits joined terrorist groups, and it is unlikely that such groups issue surveys their recruits, with it being further unlikely that one could find such data if it did in fact exist. Thirdly, one would be wise to not take potential statements by terrorist groups at face value, regarding their recruitment levels. It would be in the best interests of terrorist groups to inflate their recruitment numbers in the first place, for propaganda purposes. It would not serve the terrorists‟ cause to state that their recruitment numbers were falling. So, regardless of the existence of targeted killings, it would be logical for terrorist groups to claim that they had high/increasing recruitment numbers in the first place. Furthermore, official terrorist statements regarding the influence of targeted killings upon recruitment levels would be suspect. If recruitment levels were falling due to targeted killings, why would the terrorists release such information, considering that it could be a sign of weakness which could further lower their recruitment levels? Would not the interests of the militants be served best by stating that targeted killings were increasing their recruitment numbers? How could one determine which was the truth? If it were true, then it would mean that the targeted killing program may be ineffective in the long run. However, if the program were effective, would it not be in the best interest of the terrorists to claim that the program was causing more recruits to join their cause?

#### Pakistan secretly loves drones – strikes don’t fray relations

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It is also telling that drones have earned the backing, albeit secret, of foreign governments. In order to maintain popular support, politicians in Pakistan and Yemen routinely rail against the U.S. drone campaign. In reality, however, the governments of both countries have supported it. During the Bush and Obama administrations, Pakistan has even periodically hosted U.S. drone facilities and has been told about strikes in advance. Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan until 2008, was not worried about the drone program’s negative publicity: “In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time,” he reportedly remarked. Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, also at times allowed drone strikes in his country and even covered for them by telling the public that they were conducted by the Yemeni air force. When the United States’ involvement was leaked in 2002, however, relations between the two countries soured. Still, Saleh later let the drone program resume in Yemen, and his replacement, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has publicly praised drones, saying that “they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target you’re aiming at.” As officials in both Pakistan and Yemen realize, U.S. drone strikes help their governments by targeting common enemies. A memo released by the antisecrecy website WikiLeaks revealed that Pakistan’s army chief, Ashfaq Parvez kayani, privately asked U.S. military leaders in 2008 for “continuous Predator coverage” over antigovernment militants, and the journalist Mark Mazzetti has reported that the United States has conducted “goodwill kills” against Pakistani militants who threatened Pakistan far more than the United States. Thus, in private, Pakistan supports the drone program. As then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told Anne Patterson, then the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, in 2008, “We’ll protest [against the drone program] in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”